On 23 August 2012, Judge Sam Sparks dismissed Lance Armstrong’s suit in the US District Court Western District of Texas (Austin) of the Federal Court, asking for an injunction to restrain USADA from proceeding against him . The judgment is attached below.

 The Judge found:

  1. Armstrong’s due process claims lack merit.
  2. The court lacks jurisdiction over Armstrong’s remaining claims, or alternatively declines to grant equitable relief.

 The key issue for the Judge in finding the due process complaints lacked merit was that Lance’s challenges are anticipating unfairness rather than being subject to them now. Lance’s challenges:

(a)     that he was not provided a adequate charging document;

(b)     that he has no guarantee of a hearing before CAS;

(c)      that he has no right cross-examine/confront witnesses against him;

(d)     that he has no right to an impartial panel;

(e)     that he has no right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence;

(f)      that he has no right to disclosure of cooperation agreements or inducements provided by usda;

(g)     that he has no right to obtain investigative witness statements;

(h)     that he has no right to obtain full disclosure of laboratory analyses or an impartial assessment of their accuracy;

(i)       that  he has no right to judicial review of the arbitrators’ decision by a US court;

are all based on speculation of bias (rather than actual bias).

 Judge Sparks said:

 “Like the Supreme Court, this Court declines to assume either the pool of potential arbitrators, or the ultimate arbitral panel itself, will be unwilling or unable to render conscientious decision based on the evidence before it.”

 Further, the Judge reasoned:

 “Further, Armstrong has ample appellate avenues open to him, first to the Court of Arbitration for Sport … where he is entitled to de novo review, and then to the  courts of Switzerland, if he so elects.”

 The Judge, however, dismissed the suit without prejudice, ie Lance can come back if things develop. Further, Judge Sparks expressed some judicial (and welcome) views on the USADA processes.

 His Honour was critical of USADA’s process:

 “As the Court stated at the hearing, ….. the deficiency of USADA’s charging document is of serious constitutional concern. Indeed, but for two facts, the Court might be inclined to find USADA’s charging letter was a violation of due process, and to enjoin USADA from proceeding thereunder. First, it would likely of no practical effect: USADA could easily issue a more detailed charging letter, at which point Armstrong would presumably once again file suit, and the parties would be back in this exact same position some time later, only poorer for their legal fees. Second, and more important, USADA’s counsel represented to the Court that Armstrong will, in fact, receive detailed disclosures regarding USADA’s claims against him at a time reasonably before arbitration, in accordance with routine procedure. The Court takes counsel at his word. With the understanding that Armstrong has received all the process he is due at this time, and will receive adequate notification of the charges against him in time to prepare a defense, the Court rejects Armstrong’s …. challenge. …… ”

 Judge Sparks then concluded that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction. The Sports Act had (“whether or not this was a good choice is, of course, debatable”) determined that sports eligibility questions would be decided through arbitration rather than federal lawsuits.

 His Honour referred to the Mary Decker Slaney case, noting that the court had said: “… when it comes to challenging the eligibility determination of the USOC, only a very specific claim will avoid the impediment to subject matter jurisdiction that (the Sports Act) poses”. The Slaney court had quoted the Tonia Harding case, in the Oregon District Court as follows:

 “There the court cautioned that…… ‘courts should rightly hesitate before intervening in disciplinary hearings held by private associations …. Intervention is appropriate only in the most extraordinary circumstances, where the association has clearly breached its own rules, that breach will imminently result in serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has exhausted all remedies.’ Yet, while carving out this limited exception to the preemption created by the Amateur Sports Act, the opinion forewarned that while examining whether internal rules had been complied with, the courts ‘should not intervene in the merits of the underlying dispute.’ ”

 Judge Sparks held, ultimately, that:

  1. Armstrong was not in danger of irreparable harm. The USADA jurisdiction issue, itself, was to be determined by the arbitrators. Further, any finding by the arbitration panel might, itself, be overturned by CAS. “In short,  any harm Armstrong might suffer is, at this point, entirely speculative.”
  2. Armstrong has not exhausted his internal remedies, namely the arbitration procedures in the USADA Protocol. Judge Sparks: “If the panel’s resolution is manifestly unjust and devoid of any reasonable legal basis, Armstrong may have a judicial remedy; but this court cannot act on the basis of a hypothetical injury.”
  3. Armstrong’s agreement with USOC bound him contractually to submit his due process concerns, themselves, to the arbitration process.


Finally, His Honour determined that, even apart from his decision on jurisdiction, if he did have such jurisdiction he would decline an equitable remedy, firstly because, for the above reasons, Armstrong was not in danger of irreparable harm, and secondly because , as a matter of international comity, the court declined to: “circumvent the longstanding system of international arbitration in Olympic sports by unilaterally enjoining that system’s operation”.

 Judge Sparks finished with a comment for USADA:

 “…. there are troubling aspects of this case, not least of which is USADA’s apparent single-minded determination to force Armstrong to arbitrate the charges against him, in direct conflict with UCI’s equally evident desire not to proceed against him….

 The events in USADA’s charging letter date back fourteen years, span a multitude of international competitions, and involve not only five non-citizens of the United States who were never licensed in this country, but also one of the most well-known figures in the history of cycling. As mystifying as USADA’s election to proceed at this date and in this manner may be, it is equally perplexing that these three national and international bodies are apparently unable to work together …..  

 So now we wait for Lance’s next step. The appeals circuit? or AAA arbitration, starting off with a serious argument on jurisdiction?

John McMullan

23 August 2012